A corporate policy that does not include pregnancy among the conditions making an employee eligible for light duty is a “neutral and legitimate business practice,” not evidence of bias against pregnant workers, according to a recent court ruling that dismissed a UPS truck driver’s claim that she was the victim of pregnancy discrimination.
Employers may craft a pregnancy-blind policy — even one that others may characterize as “insufficiently charitable,” the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 2013 WL 93132 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013). “A lack of charity does not amount to discriminatory animus directed at a protected class of employees,” the court said.
The appellate court agreed with the summary judgment ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, finding that UPS did not discriminate against Peggy Young in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Under UPS policy and the applicable collective bargaining agreement, a pregnant employee can continue working as long as she can perform the essential functions of her job, but is ineligible for light duty work for any limitations arising solely as a result of her pregnancy.
The court affirmed that the UPS policy does not violate PDA by limiting “light duty” accommodations to employees: (1) injured on the job; (2) disabled as defined under ADA; or (3) legally unable to work as truck drivers due to a loss of their Department of Transportation certification.
“PDA does not require employers to extend any benefit to pregnant women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees,” the court opined. In this instance, the law did not mandate UPS to provide accommodation or light duty work to Young, whose restrictions arose from her (off-the-job) pregnancy. This, too, would be the case for an employee who injured his back while picking up his infant child or for an employee whose lifting limitations happened because of her off-the-job work as a volunteer firefighter.
The court said it was not persuaded by Young’s contention, which implied “a demand for preferential treatment” that is not covered under PDA.
ADA advises employers to initiate “an informal, interactive process” when determining whether an individual with a disability needs accommodation. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3). However, the appellate court said, no such counsel applies to the actual determination of whether an employee is disabled in the first instance.
Given the relatively manageable weight restriction (20 pounds) and the short duration of the restriction, Young presented no evidence to (1) support her “regarded as” claim that her supervisor subjectively believed her to be disabled; or (2) demonstrate that her pregnancy or attendant lifting limitation constituted a disability under ADA, the higher court found.
The circuit court also agreed with the district court’s view that “because UPS possessed objective facts suggesting Young might have lost the ability to perform central job functions, it had a legitimate reason to seek some verification that Young had recovered her ability to perform those duties.”
With respect to the alleged PDA violation, Young and the American Civil Liberties Union argued that “PDA explicitly alters the traditional sex discrimination analysis under Title VII by restricting the basis upon which employers may compare pregnant workers with non-pregnant workers.”
This position, the appeals court determined, would compel employers to grant pregnant employees a “most favored nation” status with others based on their ability to work, regardless of whether such status was available to the universe of non-pregnant employees.
In sum, “employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but non-pregnant employees,” the circuit court found, citing from case law and adhering to what it called a majority view on the issue.
Final Thoughts
PDA makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions. However, PDA’s second clause mandates that pregnant employees “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.”
The Young court found that when a clearly written policy treats pregnant workers and non-pregnant workers alike, the employer has complied with PDA.
Moreover, the Young court made clear in its ruling that a pregnant worker subject to a temporary lifting restriction is not similar in her “ability or inability to work” to an employee disabled within the meaning of ADA. Young’s lifting limitation was not a significant restriction on her ability to perform major life activities, in the court’s view.
For complete coverage of the case, visit Thompson’s HR Compliance.
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